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R E S U LT S

Proving Foundation Impact on Public
Policy Empirically: The Case of the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation and Consumer
Choice for Adults With Developmental
Disabilities
Ann Whitney Breihan, M.B.A., Ph.D., College of Notre Dame of Maryland

Key Points

Background

· Foundations that work on national public policy
issues face challenges in demonstrating impact.

Who should choose residential and day program
providers for adults with developmental disabilities? This is an important question, though one
that rarely gets media attention. About 3.5 million
adults in the United States have intellectual or
developmental disabilities (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2003; U.S. Census
Bureau, 2000). Many reside with their families
and receive no state-funded services. But more
than 400,000 do receive support through services
provided with state and federal assistance that
exceeded $38 billion in 2005 alone (Braddock,
Hemp, Rizzolo, et al., 2005).

· This case study of how the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s initiative to support choice of
program provider for developmentally disabled
adults uses some advanced statistical techniques
to demonstrate the impact of the foundation’s
funding.
· This study suggests that to get the greatest
impact on policy change, foundations should
consider offering modest competitive grants to
governmental departments; spending the funds in
regional groupings; and focus on jurisdictions that
have demonstrated interest in the policy area by
spending their own funds.

Service provision for adults with developmental
disabilities has changed substantially over the past
40 years. Through the 1970s, government-funded
services were provided almost exclusively in large
Introduction
state residential institutions. In that decade, howHow can foundations measure the impact
ever, tremendous changes began. Federal classthey have on public policies nationwide?
action lawsuits were used to advance the idea
Many foundations require that their grantees
that people living in institutions were, in effect,
conduct program evaluations on the activities
they fund; some aggregate these to explore their being incarcerated without having been convicted
impact. But is it possible to measure the impact of committing a crime. These suits forced states
to provide services in community settings for at
that funding in just a few states can have on
least some of their citizens with developmental
policies all across the nation? This case study
disabilities. At the same time, Congress adopted
offers a template for achieving this goal and
changes in the Medicaid program that eventuobservations about how foundations can best
ally made it possible for some federal funding to
target their investments, given these empirical
support adults with developmental disabilities
findings.
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in programs outside the state institutions. By
the early 1990s, a movement emerged favoring
self-determination for adults with developmental
disabilities, and further Medicaid changes made it
possible, in theory, for adults with developmental
disabilities to select their care providers. This was
not common, however; in 1992, 42 states continued to mandate who the service provider would
be for every individual who received governmentfunded services (Breihan, 2007).
One foundation supported self-determination as
public policy. In 1993, the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation (RWJF) offered limited assistance
to one region of New Hampshire to fund a trial
effort permitting adults with developmental disabilities to choose their own service providers.
This was followed three years later with a national
request for funding proposals (RFP) for the
Initiative for Self-Determination for People with
Developmental Disabilities, offering funding that
would cover some states’ pilot projects to provide
greater consumer choice of provider for groups
of adults with developmental disabilities. This
research tracks the impact that RWJ Foundation
had on this issue from 1993 to 2004, when all but
nine states offered some adults with developmental disabilities the opportunity to choose their
service provider.
Foundations have been exhorted to use their resources to have a strategic impact in social justice
and other public policy areas (Bailin, 2003; Ferris
& Mintrom, 2002; Stauber, 2001; Weissert, 1995).
Substantial research has been done about the
patterns of adult developmental disability service
provision and funding and about state policy innovation patterns for high visibility issues (Gray,
1973; Lakin, Prouty, Polister, & Smith, 2002; Lowi,
1964; Mintrom, 1997; Nice, 1997; Polister, Smith,
Lakin, Prouty, & Smith, 2002; Sapat, 2004; Walker,
1969). Much literature exists about the importance of adults with developmental disabilities
being able to make personal choices in basic
decisions, such as where they will live. However,
little empirical work has been presented at the
intersection of these perspectives. This work addresses that gap by offering an empirical analysis
of the impact of RWJF on the spread of increased
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consumer choice of service provider across the
U.S. for young adults transitioning into adult
developmental disabilities services.

Methodology
This study took place in two stages. The first part
was to determine whether there really was a widespread change in the policy of states or whether
change was restricted to a modest proportion of
states, perhaps some of the group that received
some funding from the RWJF. The second step
was to analyze each state in detail to ascertain
what factors could predict if and when that state
would change its public policy. The only way to
determine the impact of foundation funding was
to also consider the other possible predictors.

A movement emerged favoring
self-determination for adults with
developmental disabilities, and
further Medicaid changes made
it possible.
Determining the Level of Choice (the Dependent
Variable)
The first step in the analysis was determining
whether choice of service provider was offered
to new recipients of developmental disabilities
funding in each state. The study focused on young
adults transitioning from the educational system
to residential services outside their parental home
and/or day program services, because they are
the new funding recipients the state can plan for
in advance, given that they have been identified
through the schools.
Telephone surveys of directors of the states’
departments overseeing services for adults with
developmental disabilities were the source of
information about the level of choice of provider
offered to transitioning young adults. I asked the
state respondent who determines the selection of
care provider for each transitioning individual. If
the response was that the transitioning individual
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FIGURE 1

Conceptual Framework

Level of Choice in Day and/or Residential Service Provider Offered by States
to Adults with Intellectual/Developmental Disabilities
Regional Variable
· CMS region influence

Variables Linked to State
Adult DD Policy
· Community setting service
provision
		· Community census
· Community residential
funding
· Litigation
· Service delivery patterns
		· Supply of community beds
		· Supply of institutional beds
· Funding levels
· Medicaid programmatic
spending
		· Total adult DD fiscal effort
· Supported Employment
spending effort
· Supported Living spending
effort

Internal Variables

Level of Choice
of Service
Provider Offered
by States to
Adults with DD

Variables Indicating
National Influences
· Federal demonstration
projects participation
· Private sector
foundation
demonstration
projects participation
· Combined privatefederal demonstration
project participation

makes the choice, I followed up to determine the
year that policy was initiated. The states were very
cooperative; in every case the state director or
that person’s designee provided the information.
Based on the responses to the survey, each state
is coded for each of the years from 1992 to 2002.
One of the complications of the study is that most
states have different ways of determining who the
service provider will be, based on disability, geographical region, and other factors. For this study,
then, each state is coded for each year based on
whether any substantial number of transitioning
individuals could choose their provider. For those
in which individuals were told which service
provider to use, the level of choice was coded as
“state-mandated.” If individuals had the opportunity to choose the provider, whether the provider
had to be taken from a list of preapproved alternatives or whether individuals were free to choose
almost any provider (excluding spouses, for example), without being limited to a preapproved list, I
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· Socio-economic
		· Wealth
		· Population size
		· Race/ Ethnicity
		· Urbanization
		· SSI – D
· State interest group
· Ideological orientation
· Electoral politics
		· Democratic governor
		· Democratic legislature
		· Electoral cycle

considered this to be “consumer choice.”
Investigating the Predictors of Consumer Choice
(Independent Variables)
To determine which factors to analyze in addition
to foundation funding, I developed models based
on four types of possible predictors of innovation.
These included predictors representing
• State adult developmental disabilities policy in
service delivery and funding-level patterns.
• Specific characteristics of each state, ranging
from socio-economic measures to demand
levels and interest group activity to partisan
orientation.
• Region and trends among neighboring states.
• Impact of national influences.
Figure 1 illustrates this overall conceptual framework. The variables are described in greater detail
in Appendix A.
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Conducting the Statistical Analysis
The statistical technique used is more complicated than the usual linear regression models
due to the wealth of information I was able to
collect. Instead of having a random sample to test
to see whether the data were representative of
the whole, I had the data for all the variables for
every state. In addition, this was not a one-time
snapshot of the impact of the RWJ Foundation’s
program, but rather an exploration of states’
actions across 11 years. Ironically, having all this
data meant that I had to use a fairly unusual technique to analyze what was happening.
The empirical analysis tool was the pooled crosssectional time-series technique of event history
analysis, adapted from the work of Berry and
Berry (1992). The analysis of factors associated
with state adoption of choice entails a set of fixed
effects linear probability models. This approach
has the advantage of letting the analyst combine
all the differences among the states that could impact policymaking — but that cannot be captured
adequately by any practical number of independent variables — into one “unobserved effect”
variable for each year of the study. In the fixed effects model, each year offers a new coefficient and
a new average idiosyncratic change in the states
(Wooldridge, 2003). This enabled me to consider
whether the states were becoming more similar or
more different over the 11-year span of the study.
Unfortunately, gaining this advantage has a disadvantage: Independent variables that are constant
over each of the series of 11 annual observations
are “swept away” by the fixed effects transformation (Wooldridge, 2003). For example, maybe the
size of the state interest group in this policy area
has an impact on change that would be interesting to examine. But the size of the interest group
(the Arc, formerly the Association for Retarded
Citizens) in most states did not change very much
during each year 1992 through 2002. This means
that “interest group” drops out as a separate variable in this model. The impact of the size of the
group still shows up in the yearly dummy variable,
but it cannot be tracked separately.
In the fixed effects linear probability model, I also
used three alternate specifications. In the first I
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used all my independent variables. In the second,
I looked at all the variables except region (percentage of the states in the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services [CMS] region offering
choice). In the third specification, I omitted both
the dummy variables for year and the variable for
region. I did this so that interesting results would
not be overwhelmed and so not appear significant
when compared with the first two most important
variables.

This pattern suggests that the
innovation of offering individual
choice was emerging steadily as a
national trend, one that accelerated
after RWJF began offering grants in
this field.
Results
The number of states offering choice of residential
services provider to young adults transitioning
to adult developmental disabilities services grew
from eight in 1992, the first year in which federal
Medicaid funds could be used for noninstitutional residential placements, to 41 in 2004. This
considerable change occurred without any federal
mandate (Figure 2).
The spread of consumer choice was analyzed
using an event history model of outcomes with
time-varying covariates. As noted in the Methodology section, this means that variables demonstrating only limited variation within the time
period studied for individual states cannot be
analyzed usefully in a fixed effects model. Due
to these impacts of the data structure, I used the
fixed effects linear probability model to examine all the states using three specifications: the
first with all the variables, the second excluding
region, and the third excluding both region and
the annual dummy variables. My reasoning was
that the very strong results for region might be
obscuring other, lesser but still important rela-
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FIGURE 2

Choice Offered by States 1992–2004

tionships. When region was excluded, more years’
annual dummy variables emerged as significant. I
wanted to have some sense of the relative importance of the other variables, so I used the model
yet again, excluding both region and the annual
dummy variables. See Appendix B for the table of
results.
Specification 1: All Independent Variables
When the fixed effects model is used with all the
variables, the percentage of states in the CMS region offering choice emerges as significant at the
0.001 level, as shown in Appendix B. This means
that states followed the lead of their neighbors in
their region (but not necessarily adjacent states).
For each 10 percent increase in states offering individual choice in the region, the probability of a
given state offering individual choice increases by
7 percent (coefficient of 0.700) by 2002, compared
with the base year of 1992.
Specification 2: All Independent Variables
Except Region
Were any other predictors important in addition to region? When “region” is eliminated, the
dummy variables for the years from 1995 to 2002
are all significant. In addition, the coefficient for
each year is larger than that for the previous year.
This pattern suggests that the innovation of of-
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fering individual choice was emerging steadily as
a national trend, one that accelerated after RWJF
began offering grants in this field.
Specification 3: All Independent Variables
Except Region and Year
When the fixed effects model is used without
the “region” or “year,” three of the remaining
variables emerge as significant and powerful. The
most important of these was foundation funding.
Participation in the RWJF-funded pilot projects
increased by 18 percent the estimated likelihood
that a state would offer consumer choice, compared with what would be expected without this
participation (coefficient of 0.183).
Two variables associated with funding for adult
developmental disabilities programming also
emerged. The first significant variable represented
funding for adult developmental disabilities
programming in proportion to state wealth. In
other words, if a state spent relatively more on
programs for developmentally disabled persons, it
was about 17 percent more likely to offer consumer choice (coefficient of 0.175). The second,
the “ratio of state to federal community residential funding” has a significant negative coefficient.
This indicates that for each 10 percent increase
in the ratio of states spending their own money
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rather than federal funds, states were 5 percent
less likely to offer individual choice (coefficient
−0.0513; see Appendix B for the table of results).

Implications
Quantitative Measurement of the Impact of
Foundation Initiatives on Policy Is Possible
This approach to developing a quantitative measure of foundation impact on a policy area across
the U.S. has some limitations but is largely practical. This study demonstrates that program evaluators can quantify the impact of the foundation’s
funding decisions. For the many policy areas in
which foundations are involved that are not “hot
button” issues, this model demonstrates that it
is possible to prove impact empirically, bearing
in mind that one needs high-quality information
about the actions the states actually take. It is
important to remember that this case study looks
at an issue that is important to many of our most
vulnerable citizens and one that involves billions
of dollars. However, this is an issue that almost
never reaches the front pages of newspapers or
the blogosphere. The results are likely to be very
different for issues that are highly politicized,
issues in which the numbers of forces influencing
the debate may be beyond what a program evaluator can truly capture.
Practical Suggestions for Effective Public Policy
Grantmaking
The findings of this study suggest some practical
guidelines for foundations that wish to achieve
the greatest possible impact for their funding
dollar in terms of influencing government policy
across the U.S.
First, consider following the strategy of RWJF in
this case study. Offer competitive grants to the
relevant civil service departments, especially if
they are not at the forefront of political debate.
The impact this approach had is, if anything,
underreflected in the statistical results. When I
interviewed the directors of developmental disabilities departments in each state, many told me
they were very much aware of RWJF funding and
felt that this initiative was a real indication that
individual choice, not state mandates, was the
coming trend. Several shared that they felt their
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state was not in a position to make a credible
application for RWJF funding, but they were very
interested in following the results of the states
in their region that did receive the funds; these
directors said this was the direction they wanted
to pursue, too, in the near future.
The financial outlay for this RWJF initiative was
relatively modest. Over the life of the project,
only about $5 million was spent. The largest
state awards were in the range of $400,000 over
two or three years, even though the average state
funding for adult disabilities services in 2002
was in excess of $250,000,000. This tremendous
impact suggests that department heads may well
be willing to make major policy changes, given
relatively small amounts of seed money to try
the innovation.
Though this case study is based on policy innovation at the state level, foundations should consider
this approach at other levels of government as
well. County or municipal departments could
be offered the opportunity to compete for funds
to try policy changes, assuming the application
process was sufficiently painless.

This is an issue that almost
never reaches the front pages of
newspapers or the blogosphere.
Second, resist the temptation to fund states scattered across the country. Rather, based on the
findings from this study, states are more likely to
“follow the pack” in their own region (a region
based on the funding patterns of the federal
government for the policy area, in this case CMS,
even over a measure of contiguity). In this study,
the proportion of states in the region that offered
choice was a strong, significant predictor of what
a given state would choose to do the following
year. In other words, focus your funding on a regional basis to build up momentum for the policy
you wish to encourage.
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This does not mean that foundations should fund
all the states in a given region. In New England, for
example, smaller states (the first with RWJF funding) offered choice first. Massachusetts, the largest
state in New England, was the last to make the
change, but it did follow the lead of its neighbors in
relatively few years. The same pattern was followed
in the Midwest (CMS Region 7), where Nebraska
and Kansas offered choice early on, and Iowa and
Missouri followed suit within a few years.

States that already have made
substantial investment in the policy
area you care about will be easier
to motivate to try your innovation,
even though they do not follow your
preferred policy currently.
Third, begin with states that have demonstrated
a real interest in the policy area that interests you
before you ever issue an RFP. States that spent
more for adult developmental disabilities services
in proportion to the state’s total personal income
were significantly more likely to offer choice
earlier. This suggests that, all other things being
equal, states that already have made substantial
investment in the policy area you care about will
be easier to motivate to try your innovation, even
though they do not follow your preferred policy
currently. And, based on the regional momentum
finding mentioned previously, their making the
change will increase the chances that their neighbors will follow suit.
What, then, does not matter? The states that usually are considered the trendsetters were not early
adopters of choice in this case study. California
was one of the last to make the change. Variables
representing electoral politics were not significant. Having a liberal governor did not make
any significant difference. Foundations, then,
may benefit from re-evaluating the states they
frequently fund first.
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In sum, empirical evaluations of the impact of
foundation funding on public policy really can be
achieved. This study offers a model for making
this assessment in an important area that receives
little publicity. Additional studies in other policy
areas would be valuable to hone this model
further.
To get the greatest impact for their investment
in (non-hot button) policy change, foundations
should consider offering modest competitive
grants to governmental departments. All other
things being equal, foundations should spend
the funds in regional groupings, not scattered
throughout the U.S. The funding should be
focused on jurisdictions that have demonstrated
interest in the policy area by spending their own
funds. This indicator is more important than a
state’s general reputation for innovation.
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APPENDIX A Detailed List of Independent Variables

Predictors of state adult developmental disabilities policy in service delivery
and funding-level patterns
· Community residential census (the number of persons with developmental disabilities [DD] residing
with state funding in settings with 15 or fewer persons divided by the number of persons in the total
population, in thousands).
· Medicaid waivers spending effort (federal and state Medicaid waiver funding for services to adults
with DD divided by the total state personal income, multiplied by 1,000)
· Total DD spending effort (the level of spending for all adult DD services per $1,000 state personal
income)
· Ratio of state to federal community residential funding (the level of state funding for community-based
residential programs for adults with DD divided by federal funding for community-based residential
programs)
· Supported employment spending effort (spending on supported employment, per $1,000 state personal income)
· Supported living and personal assistance spending effort (spending on supported living and personal
assistants, per $1,000 state personal income)
Note. These variable choices were influenced by Braddock et al., unpublished data, 2002; Braddock and Fujiura, 1987;
Braddock, Hemp, Parish, et al., 2000; Garrett, 2002; Grogan, 1994,; McGaughey & Mank, 2001; Parish, 2001; Sigelman,
Roeder, & Sigelman, 1981.
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APPENDIX A continued

Individual characteristics of each state
· Percentage population Hispanic
· Percentage of population living in urban areas
· SSI-Disability funded census per total population
· ARC membership per population (The Arc, formerly the Association for Retarded Citizens is the principal advocacy group for persons with developmental disabilities nationwide.)
· Liberal (This score was derived by averaging the scores given to each member of the congressional
delegation of the state for each year by the Americans for Democratic Action [ADA]. The ADA ratings
for each federal legislator is recorded on the ADA Web site. The scores for each state for both parties
are then weighted on the basis of the partisan composition to the state legislatures.)
· Democratic governor
· Election year (This lagged variable is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if it is the year after an
election year for the governorship and 0 if it is not.
Note. These variable choices were influenced by Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Berry & Berry, 1990, 1992; Braddock & Fujiura,
1991; Buchanan, Cappellini, & Ohsfeldt, 1991; DiLeo, 2001; Elazar, 1984; Gray, 1973; Harrington, Carrillo, Wellin, Miller, &
LeBlanc, 2000; Heclo, 1978; Jacoby & Schneider, 2001; Ka & Teske, 2002; Kingdon, 1995; Lowi, 1964; Mohr, 1969; Mooney
& Lee, 1995; Rigby, Brooks-Gunn, & Kagan, 2004; Sapat, 2004; Schneider, 1993; Schneider & Jacoby, 1996; Walker, 1969;
Walker, 1983.

Region and trends among neighboring states
· Percentage of the states in the CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) region offering
choice
Note. This variable choice was influenced by Berry & Berry, 1990; Daley & Garand, 2002; Glick & Hays, 1991; Jacoby &
Schneider, 2001; Lutz, 1989; Mooney, 2001; Mooney & Lee, 1995; Rogers, 1995; Sharkansky, 1969.

National influences
· Number of federally funded demonstration projects (This lagged variable denotes the number of federal demonstration projects related to consumer choice that the state participated in before the year
in question. These include community supported living arrangements (CSLA); programs in the eight
states of California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin; and
the Florida 115 Demonstration authorizing an Independence Plus waiver.)
· Number of Robert Wood Johnson Foundation-funded demonstration projects (This lagged variable
expresses the number of times that the state participated in a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
consumer choice demonstration project before the year in question. This includes the initial funding for New Hampshire from 1993 to 1996, beginning with the Monadnock Developmental Services
project and the National Initiative on Self-Determination for Persons with Developmental Disabilities,
funded in 18 additional states in 1997.
· Cash and Counseling Demonstration Project (This lagged variable records whether states participated in the foundation and federal demonstration grant program, sponsored jointly by the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.)
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APPENDIX B Results of Fixed Effects Linear Probability Model of Independent Variables Associated With Choice

Specification 3:
Excluding CMS
region and year
(standard error)

Variables

Specification 1:
All variables
(standard error)

Specification 2:
Excluding CMS region
(standard error)

Year 1993

0.00963 (0.059)

0.0186 (0.061)

Year 1994

0.0651 (0.061)

0.0908 (0.063)

Year 1995

0.0703 (0.062)

0.166** (0.064)

Year 1996

0.0416 (0.069)

0.198** (0.067)

Year 1997

0.102 (0.073)

0.288*** (0.070)

Year 1998

0.109 (0.077)

0.341*** (0.071)

Year 1999

0.146 (0.082)

0.432*** (0.072)

Year 2000

0.145 (0.087)

0.475*** (0.074)

Year 2001

0.175* (0.089)

0.503*** (0.077)

Year 2002

0.198* (0.097)

0.554*** (0.083)

Supported employment
spending effort

−0.041 (0.44)

0.0776 (0.45)

0.182 (0.49)

Supported living and
personal assistance
spending effort

−0.092 (0.080)

−0.107 (0.078)

0.0494 (0.085)

−0.00940 (0.019)

−0.00597 (0.019)

−0.0513** (0.020)

Developmental disabilities
spending effort

0.0251 (0.044)

0.0389 (0.045)

0.175*** (0.045)

Medicaid waiver spending
effort

0.000303 (0.001)

0.000315 (0.0012)

0.00433*** (0.0012)

Percentage of states in the
CMS region offering choice

0.700*** (0.11)

Developmental
disabilities policy
variables

Ratio of state to federal
community residential
funding
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APPENDIX B continued.

Specification 1:
All variables
(standard error)

Specification 2:
Excluding CMS region
(standard error)

Specification 3:
Excluding CMS
region and year
(standard error)

Democratic governor

−0.0496 (0.034)

−0.0300 (0.035)

−0.0478 (0.037)

Election year (lagged)

0.0416 (0.034)

0.0364 (0.035)

0.0376 (0.030)

Number of Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation
funded demonstration
project(s)

0.0177 (0.051)

0.00650 (0.053)

0.183*** (0.048)

Number of federally funded
demonstration projects

0.0250 (0.011)

0.128 (0.10)

0.113 (0.12)

Cash and Counseling
Demonstration Project

−0.1776 (0.11)

−.245* (0.12)

−.0587 (0.12)

R2

within = 0.3886

within = 0.3975

within = 0.1788

between = 0.0028

between = 0.0094

between = 0.0002

overall = 0.1422

overall = 0.1735

overall = 0.0326

F(11, 489) = 28.26

F(21, 479) = 15.05

F(32, 322) = 8.66

Prob > F = 0.0000

Prob > F = 0.0000

Prob > F = 0.0000

Variables
Internal variables

Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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